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Taming Governance with Legality? 
Critical Reflections upon Global Administrative Law  
as Small-c Global Constitutionalism 
ABSTRACT 
The project of global administrative law has stood out from various efforts to tame 
global governance with the rule of law. By enhancing transparency and accountability, 
global administrative law is expected to improve the policy output of global administra-
tion, giving legitimacy to global governance. In this way, global administrative law 
evolves into a small-c global constitutionalism. In this paper, I trace the trajectory of 
global administrative law as small-c global constitutionalism and how the concept of 
legitimacy is recast in relation to global governance. I first point out that originally em-
bedded in the practice of global governance, global administrative law effectively func-
tions as the small-c constitutional law of global governance, echoing the trends toward 
constitutionalization. As it takes on constitutional character, however, global adminis-
trative law faces the challenges of legality and legitimacy. Turning away from state con-
sent, global administrative law turns to the idea of publicness as solution to its double 
challenges. My inspection of the notion of publicness in global administrative law 
shows that the strategy of resting the legitimacy of global administrative law as small-c 
global constitutionalism on the idea of publicness turns out to be the privatization of 
legitimacy, suggesting a post-public concept of legitimacy. 
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Taming Governance with Legality? 
Critical Reflections upon Global Administrative Law  
as Small-c Global Constitutionalism 
INTRODUCTION 
Globalisation reinvigorates interest in the long-standing movement for international rule 
of law.1 Global governance becomes the central concept around which various projects 
for legal reform are organised.2 Regardless of distinctive understandings of global gov-
ernance, it is evocative of some sort of political ordering that transcends nation-states.3 
For this reason, the efforts to consolidate global governance with a legal framework are 
faced with a fundamental challenge as to the legitimacy of the proposed transnational 
legal orders.4  
                                                 
  This paper is based on my presentation at University of Bremen in Germany on 14 February, 2011 under the 
sponsorship of the Collaborative Research Centre of the Transformations of the State as well as the Centre of 
European Law and Politics at University of Bremen. I have benefited from all the comments I received from the 
participants in the research seminar. Special thanks goes to two anonymous reviewers. The comments and sug-
gestions from Christian Joerges, Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Stephan Leibfried, and Lars Viellechner are especially ac-
knowledged. All errors are mine, though. I am grateful for the great hospitality from my host during my stay in 
Bremen. This paper draws upon my ‘Between Fragmentation and Unity: The Uneasy Relationship between 
Global Administrative Law and Global Constitutionalism’ and ‘The Concept of “Law” in Global Administrative 
Law: A Reply to Benedict Kingsbury’, which have published in San Diego International Law Journal (2009) 10: 
439-67 and European Journal of International Law (2009) 20: 997-1004, respectively. Comments are welcome. 
E-Mail: M-S.Kuo@warwick.ac.uk. A refined version will appear in New York University Journal of International 
Law and Politics (2011) 44: forthcoming. 
1 See David Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’ in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman (eds), Rul-
ing the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (CUP 2009). See also Martti 
Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law: Between Techniques and Politics’ (2007) 70 MLR 1, 1-3. 
2 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press 2004). See also Daniel C Esty, ‘Good 
Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law’ (2006) 115 Yale LJ 1490; Gralf-Peter 
Calliess and Moritz Renner, ‘Between Law and Social Norms: The Evolution of Global Governance’ (2009) 22 
Ratio Juris 260. 
3 See Claus Offe, ‘Governance: An “Empty Signifier”?’ (2009) 16 Constellations 550, 550-54. 
4 See JHH Weiler, ‘The Geology of International Law – Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy’ (2004) 64 Hei-
delberg J Int’l L (ZaöRV) 547, 560-62; Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Post-
national Law (OUP 2010). 
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Aware of the elusiveness of the idea of a global political community,5 some propo-
nents of global governance turn to administrative law as the main tool to lay legal 
grounds for global governance.6 Instead of pinning their hopes on a comprehensive con-
stitution-like charter to govern the operation of global administration,7 aspirants for 
global governance cast their eyes on two aspects. First, they put emphasis on the en-
hancement of the transparency and accountability of diffuse transnational regulatory 
regimes. Second, they focus attention on the improvement of the reasonableness and 
procedural fairness of decisions made under transnational regulatory frameworks. Both 
are aimed at bolstering the legitimacy of global administration by enhancing the quality 
of policy results and bridging the gap between transnational decision-making mecha-
nisms and interested parties.8 Correspondingly, traditional tools of administrative law 
such as the requirements of reason-giving and due process, including the rights to be 
noticed and hearing and effective judicial review, are employed to contribute to the le-
gitimacy of global regulatory regimes.9 Global administrative law is regarded as essen-
tial to the growth of global governance, setting itself apart from other proposals to rest 
global governance on a legal basis.10  
In the meantime, other advocates for global governance are driven by the global mi-
gration of constitutional ideas. Inspired by the ideas associated with constitutionalism 
and encouraged by the experiences of constitutional democracies, especially in the post-
                                                 
5 See Krisch (n 4) 54-61. See also Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Constitutionalism in International Law: Comment on a 
Proposal from Germany’ (2006) 47 Harv Int’l LJ 223, 233-236. Cf Ulrich K Preuss, ‘Equality of States—Its 
Meaning in a Constitutionalized Global Order’ (2008) 9 Chicago J Int’l L 17, 41-45. But see David Held, Democ-
racy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Stanford University Press 
1995). 
6 See eg Esty (n 2); Sabino Cassese, ‘Administrative Law without the State? The Challenge of Global Regulation’ 
(2005) 37 NYU J Int’l L & Pol 663. 
7 See Cassese (n 6) 687-89; Nico Krisch, ‘Global Administrative Law and the Constitutional Ambition’ in Petra 
Dobner and Martin Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of Constitutionalism (OUP 2010) 245. See also Krisch (n 4) 57-
104. 
8 See Esty (n 2) 1561; Cassese (n 6) 687-89.  
9 See Esty (n 2); Benedict Kingsbury and others, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’ (2005) 68 LCP 
15, 37-41; Benedict Kingsbury, ‘The Concept of “Law” in Global Administrative Law’ (2009) 20 EJIL 23, 34-50. 
See also Armin von Bogdandy, ‘General Principles of International Public Authority: Sketching a Research 
Field’ (2008) 9 German LJ 1909, 1928-38. 
10 See Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman, ‘A Functional Approach to International Constitutionalization’ in 
Dunoff and Trachtman (n 1) (separating legal proposals for global governance into three schools of thought: in-
ternational constitutionalisation, legal pluralism, and global administrative law). 
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Cold War era, they ambitiously envision a constitutional version of global governance.11 
They do not contest the importance of administrative law in the build-up of global gov-
ernance. Rather, they regard the emergence of global administrative law as laying the 
groundwork for placing global administration within a constitutional framework.12 Be-
yond administrative law, they contend that global administrative law paves the way for 
constitionalising the component regulatory regimes of global administration in the fu-
ture. Seen in this light, global governance is expected to evolve from a cluster of trans-
national regulator regimes into a global legal order with constitutional values.13 
It remains to be seen whether global governance will continue as a descriptor of 
various transnational regulatory regimes that jointly manage global administration or 
move towards a constitutionalised framework under which transboundary issues are to 
be resolved. Notably, corresponding to the role of domestic administrative law in con-
stitutional democracies, global administrative law functions to spell out the fundamental 
norms underpinning the relationship between global governance and its interested par-
ties. Compared with the relationship between administrative law and the constitution in 
the domestic context, however, the alignment of global governance with legality as 
noted above poses some theoretical challenges to global administrative law.  
By looking into the way that global administrative law takes on constitutional char-
acter, I aim to argue that global administrative law has emerged as a small-c constitu-
tional law of global governance but in the meantime conceived of legitimacy in a dis-
tinctive way, suggesting the notion of what I call post-public legitimacy.14 In the domes-
tic context, the small-c constitution comprises not only constitutional principles and 
doctrines proclaimed in the case law of the judiciary but also the so-called super stat-
utes, including administrative procedure legislation and election laws, to name just a 
pair.15 In contrast, the constitutional character of global administrative law is con-
structed free of a Capital-C global Constitution. Unmoored from a Capital-C Constitu-
tion, global administrative law is faced with the question of legitimacy as it takes on 
constitutional character. In response, the legitimacy of global administrative law is ar-
                                                 
11 See Krisch (n 4) 31-32. 
12 See Matthias Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between Constitutional-
ism in and beyond the State’ in Dunoff and Trachtman (n 1) 312. 
13 See also Dunoff and Trachtman (n 10) 33-34. 
14 See Ming-Sung Kuo, ‘The Concept of “Law” in Global Administrative Law: A Reply to Benedict Kingsbury’ 
(2009) 20 EJIL 997.  
15 See William N Eskridge, Jr. and John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution (Yale 
University Press 2010) 1-28. See also William F. Harris II, The Interpretable Constitution (Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press 1993) 104-13. 
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gued to rest on the normative idea of publicness that bridges democracy and the rule of 
law rather than on an author-based Capital-C Constitution.16 
A close inspection on the idea of publicness portrayed in global administrative law 
scholarship, I argue, shows that it suggests a post-public legitimacy. Stripped of a global 
public and embedded in the diffusion of global regulatory regimes targeting at particular 
interested parties, global administrative law lacks a general notion of publicness. 
Rather, the idea of publicness central to global administrative law as the small-c consti-
tution of global governance is fragmented and centred on particular regulatory regimes, 
pointing to a post-public legitimacy. My argument proceeds as follows: Part II explores 
how global administrative law is conceived in global governance and takes on constitu-
tional character. Part III examines the issues embedded in the discourse on global ad-
ministrative law as a small-c global constitutionalism. Part IV provides a summary of 
the main arguments. 
ALIGNING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE WITH LEGALITY:  
THE INEVITABILITY OF CONSTITUTION TALKS  
The buzzword ‘globalisation’ characterises myriads of developments that started prior 
to, or in the wake of, the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and has since become virtually ir-
resistible to academic disciplines. Law is no exception. ‘Legal globalisation’,17 ‘the 
globalisation of law’,18 or anything with an epithet evoking globalisation such as the 
‘global rule of law’19 and ‘globalised judiciary’20 are widespread in legal scholarship. In 
this Part, I first discuss how administrative law has been brought into the fold of global-
isation scholarship. Next, I proceed to explore the way that constitutionalism has been 
projected beyond state boundaries. This Part concludes with the suggestion that at-
tempts to tame global governance with administrative law tends to take on constitu-
tional character, indicating an emerging small-c global constitutionalism. 
                                                 
16 See Kingsbury (n 9). 
17 See eg David Levi-Faur, ‘The Political Economy of Legal Globalization: Juridification, Adversarial Legalism and 
Responsive Regulation. A Comment’ (2005) 59 International Organization 451. 
18 See eg Martin Shapiro, ‘The Globalization of Law’ (1993) 1 Ind J Global Legal Stud 37 (1993); Sabino Cassese, 
‘The Globalization of Law’ (2005) 37 NYU J Int’l L & Pol 973. See also Duncan Kennedy, ‘Two Globalizations 
of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–1968’ (2003) 36 Suffolk UL Rev 631. 
19 See eg Ruti Teitel, ‘The Alien Tort and the Global Rule of Law’ (2005) 57 International Social Science Journal 
551. 
20 See eg Ken I. Kersch, ‘The “Globalized Judiciary” and the Rule of Law’ (2004) 13 Good Society 17. 
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Making Sense of Global Administrative Law:  
The Bootstrapping of Global Governance 
While administrative law is conventionally discussed in the domestic context, it has 
been noted that it also exists in international settings.21 In contrast to the old ‘interna-
tional administrative law’, the identity of global administrative law is constructed against 
the backdrop of emerging global governance that transcends the boundaries of nation-
states. Global administrative law is to global governance as international administrative 
law is to ‘international administration’.22 The notion of international administration, the 
object that international administrative law aims to rein in, is broad, including not only 
international institutions but also domestic administrative actors when they function in 
relation to transboundary regulations.23 In contrast, global governance, or global ad-
ministration to which global administrative law is seen to respond, is more complex and 
multifarious. 
In a pioneering work on the concept of global administrative law, Benedict Kings-
bury, Nico Krisch, and Richard Stewart argue that global administration sets the emerg-
ing global administrative law apart from traditional international administrative law.24 
They further divide global administration into five types. In addition to international 
administration and what they call ‘distributed administration’, both of which were for-
merly the objects of international administrative law,25 they identify three other types of 
global administration: ‘transnational networks and coordination arrangements’, 
‘hybrid intergovernmental-private administration’, and ‘private bodies’.26 To address the 
                                                 
21 See Kingsbury and others (n 9) 19–20. See also Esty (n 2) 1493–95. 
22 See Kingsbury and others (n 9) 18–19. 
23 See ibid 18–20. 
24 See ibid 20–23. See also Nico Krisch and Benedict Kingsbury, ‘Introduction: Global Governance and Global 
Administrative Law in the International Legal Order’(2006) 17 EJIL 1, 2–3. 
25 According to Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart’s definition, ‘distributed administration’ refers to the type of ad-
ministration in which ‘domestic regulatory agencies act as part of the global administrative space . . . tak[ing] de-
cisions on issues of foreign or global concern’. See Kingsbury and others (n 9) 21. Also, they note that the pre-
1945 ‘broad notions of “international administration”’ included not only ‘international institutions’ but also ‘do-
mestic administrative actors when taking actions with transboundary significance’. See ibid 19–21. Taken to-
gether, what Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart calls ‘distributed administration’ constitutes part of ‘broad notions 
of “international administration”’ in the pre-1945 international administrative law, while ‘international admini-
stration’ in their definition refers to the narrower notion of ‘international institutions’. Ibid.  
26 In Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart’s definition, ‘transnational networks and coordination arrangements’ as ‘hori-
zontal form of administration’ are ‘characterized by the absence of a binding formal decisionmaking structure and 
the dominance of informal cooperation among state regulators’. Ibid 21. An example of this type of global ad-
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issues arising from global governance, traditional administrative law tools such as proce-
dural fairness, the transparency requirement, and accountability control are deployed in 
the global setting, giving rise to ‘global administrative law’.27 
As Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart note, informality and pluralism, among other 
things, distinguish global administrative law from traditional administrative law, both 
domestic and international.28 This is not surprising given that global administrative law 
aims to tame and improve global administration, which, as noted above, includes conven-
tional international administration and new types of administration. Thus, the novelty of 
global administration lies not only in its containing new types of administration but also 
its reconfiguring of the conventional types of international administration in the global 
context. While the new types of administration reflect the informal nature of global 
governance, the coexistence of new and conventional types of administration in global 
governance indicates the multifaceted constitution of global governance. Yet, to make 
sense of global administrative law, a closer look at the constitution of global governance 
and its role in theorising global administrative law is required. 
New types of administration require corresponding new visions of administrative 
law. With the emergence of informal types of administration such as transnational 
networks and coordination arrangements, hybrid administration, and private bodies, an 
informality-oriented administrative law seems to be necessary.29 Notably, this emerging 
administrative law that corresponds to global administration does not replace but instead 
coexists with traditional administrative law, including international administrative law and 
domestic administrative law. Nevertheless, these new types of administration, together 
with conventional international administration, are reconceptualised as being subsumed 
under the rubric of global governance, calling for global administrative law in the place 
of traditional international administrative law. 
                                                                                                                                               
ministration is the Basel Committee, under which the heads of various central banks, ‘outside any treaty struc-
ture’, are brought together in order to coordinate their policies on capital adequacy requirements for banks among 
other things. Ibid. ‘Hybrid intergovernmental-private administration’ refers to bodies, which combine private and 
governmental actors, in charge of various transboundary regulatory matters. Ibid 22. For example, the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, which produces standards on food safety that gain a quasi-mandatory effect via the 
SPS Agreement under the WTO law, is composed of non-governmental actors as well as governmental represen-
tatives. Ibid. As regards ‘private bodies’ in global administration, Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart discuss the pri-
vate International Standardization Organization (ISO) among other examples. Ibid 22–23. The over 13,000 stan-
dards that the ISO has adopted to harmonise product and process rules not only have major economic impacts but 
are also used in regulatory decisions by treaty based authorities such as the WTO. Ibid. 
27 See ibid 37–41; Esty (2) 1524–37. 
28 See Kingsbury and others (n 9) 53–54. 
29 See ibid; Esty (n 2) 1537–42. See also Cassese (n 18) 976–77. 
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Tracing the origin of global governance back to the mid-nineteenth century, Kings-
bury, Krisch, and Stewart regard the pre-1945 paradigm of international administrative 
law as its predecessor.30 Still, international administrative law differs from the emerging 
global administrative law in an important way. International administration, which was 
at the centre of traditional international administrative law, did not go beyond the West-
phalian system of nation-states. International administrative law was secondary to do-
mestic administrative law. On the one hand, international administrative law focused on 
areas such as postal services, navigation, and telecommunication, which gave rise to 
‘international unions’,31 and indeed derived from the international union-creating trea-
ties that were concluded under the Westphalian system.32 On the other hand, international 
administrative law only extended indirectly to domestic administrators with minor ef-
fects.33 Specifically, although it has been argued that international unions were trusted 
‘with significant powers of secondary rulemaking which did not require national rati-
fication to be legally effective’, these autonomous secondary rulemaking powers only 
existed in fields whose regulatory framework had been set out in treaties.34 To address 
the regulatory issues left out by unratified secondary rules, domestic administrators 
were included in the notion of international administration. By way of the cooperation 
of domestic administrators with international institutions, the regulatory objectives of 
international unions could be fulfilled.35 In terms of the development of international 
administrative law, domestic administrators played the central role in the success of in-
ternational administration. 
In contrast, the position of domestic administrators in global governance is not dis-
tinctive from that of other regulatory players. Rather, these administrators share the centre 
stage as main players with other actors from the private realm and international civil 
service. Domestic administrators, both in international administration that involves in-
tergovernmental organisations established by treaties or executive agreements and in 
distributed administration or other types of global administration, and other actors are 
equal players in an extended sphere of global administration.36 This new ‘global ad-
                                                 
30 See Kingsbury and others (n 9) 19–20 & n11. See also Weiler (n 4) 553. 
31 See Kingsbury and others (n 9) 19. 
32 See Weiler (n 4) 555. 
33 See Kingsbury and others (n 9) 19. 
34 See ibid. 
35 See ibid. 
36 See ibid 20–27. 
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ministrative space’ transcends nation-states, suggesting the post-Westphalian and post-
Hobbesian characteristics of global administrative law.37 
Global administrative law is post-Westphalian because nation-states and their repre-
sentatives do not play dominant roles in the administrative space. In order to resolve 
diverse transboundary issues ranging from core concerns such as antiterrorism re-
sponses and other national security questions to everyday routine matters like fishery 
supply, national governments need to cooperate with all possible players, regardless of 
whether they operate within the national boundary.38 Nation-states in the traditional 
form, which occupy the centre of the Westphalian world system, no longer hold a mo-
nopoly on transboundary regulatory issues. Instead, nation-states are disaggregating.39 
Moreover, the relationship among the players in the global administrative space is post-
Hobbesian in that national self-interest plays a minor role in global administration. The 
problem-solving attitude of pragmatism takes the place of realism in addressing trans-
boundary regulatory issues.40 Certainly, transnational cooperation in tackling trans-
boundary issues is no novelty, yet what distinguishes the concept of global adminis-
trative space and the corresponding global administrative law is that cooperative efforts 
are reinterpreted through a pragmatic lens. 
Specifically, this pragmatism at the heart of global administrative law and global 
governance involves a twofold conceptual shift. First, given the transboundary or global 
nature of contemporary regulatory issues, administrative space, which was previously 
centred on the nation-state, has been reconceptualised. While traditional nation-state-
centred administrative space covers the area of the politico-juridical authority of the na-
tion-state, this new administrative space is conceptualised in accordance with the nature 
of the subject matter at issue. In other words, in traditional administrative law, adminis-
trative space, the object of administrative law, is defined by the source of its delegated 
authority.41 Thus, nation-states, as the only source of legitimate power in the West-
phalian world system, determine the scope of administrative space. In terms of domestic 
law, the nation-state constitutes the prototype of domestic administrative space, while 
internationally the scope of administrative law extends only to the subject matters that 
                                                 
37 See generally Mathias Albert and Tanja Kopp-Malek, ‘The Pragmatism of Global and European Governance: Emerg-
ing Forms of the Political “Beyond Westphalia”’ (2002) 31 Millennium – Journal of International Studies 453. 
38 See Cassese (n 18) 973–77. See also Cassese (n 6) 663–670. 
39 See generally Slaughter (n 2); Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Global Government Networks, Global Information Agen-
cies, and Disaggregated Democracy’ (2003) 24 Mich J Int’l L 1041. 
40 See Kingsbury and others (n 9) 54–57. 
41 See generally Jack M Beermann, ‘The Reach of Administrative Law in the United States’ in Michael Taggart 
(ed), The Province of Administrative Law (Hart 1997). 
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nation-states consent to delegate to international institutions or other treaty-based regu-
latory mechanisms.42 
In contrast, in global administrative law, the targeted administrative space is deter-
mined by how and where global regulatory issues will be best tackled.43 The scope of 
global administrative space is not embedded in the source of legitimate power but is func-
tionally determined instead. Nation-states function in regard to global administration as 
subnational administrative districts do in regard to national administration, except that 
the national constitution serves as the reference point for the relationship between sub-
national administrative districts and national administration, whereas the superimposi-
tion of global administration on existing administrative spaces is functionally motivated. 
Second, global administrative law serves to improve the functionality of global gov-
ernance. Given that global administrative space provides a better arena for dealing with 
global regulatory issues, global administrative law adopts administrative law tools from 
national experiences, with an eye to making the decisions of global administrative play-
ers more acceptable to those under regulation.44 It should be noted, however, that these 
tools were developed to address the normative position of regulatory administration in 
relation to other branches of power in national constitutional systems.45 Even though 
there may be common procedural mechanisms and substantive values in terms of com-
parative administrative law, they materialised with reference to individual constitutional 
norms and legal traditions.46 
In contrast, in the global administrative space, which lacks a common set of consti-
tutional norms and a shared legal tradition, global administrative law focuses on mak-
ing people receptive to the decisions of global governance. Global administrative law 
works to improve the rationality of the decisions by enhancing the role of reason and 
                                                 
42 This is reflected in what Joseph Weiler calls the transactional model of international governance. See Weiler (n 4) 
553-56. 
43 See Andreas Fisher-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, ‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the 
Fragmentation of Global Law’ (2004) 25 Mich J Int’l L 999, 1021. Cf Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law 
(OUP 2003) 97 (noting the emergence of ‘a “systems-oriented” framework of regulatory law operating in accor-
dance with a “single logic of rule”’, which transcends territorial units, in the post-nation-state age of ‘imperial 
sovereignty’). 
44 See Esty (n 2) 1524–37. 
45 For example, the enactment of Administrative Procedure Act in the United States and the jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court on administrative law are aimed to address the needs of the administrative/regulatory state under 
the separation-of power structure conceived in the American constitutional system. See Stephen G Breyer and 
others, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy: Problems, Text, and Cases (6th edn, Aspen 2006) 13–37. 
46 See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman and Peter L Lindseth (eds), Comparative Administrative Law (Edward Elgar 
2010). See also Beermann (n 41).  
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rationality in the decision-making process. Also, by providing for reviewing mecha-
nisms through which not only arbitrary or capricious decisions but also irrational poli-
cies can be detected and set aside, reason and rationality are expected to duly function in 
global administration.47 Global administrative law, as a discipline and as a practice, by 
combining its function-driven nature and the configuration of global administrative 
space transcending existing politico-juridical spaces defined by national constitutions, is 
part of the bootstrapping of global governance.48 Global administrative law helps a 
function-driven, pragmatic global administration to fulfil its self-imposed telos of 
ushering in the global era of the rule of law by increasing the acceptability of its deci-
sions concerning global regulatory issues. 
From Functional Administration to Constitutionalisation:  
The Constitutional Spillover of Global Administrative Law  
As pointed out in the preceding section, global administrative law is tied to global gov-
ernance. The central goal of global governance is to effectively resolve global regulatory 
issues through reasonable and rational measures. Driven by this problem-solving mental-
ity, administrative actors in the global administrative space develop different patterns of 
measures, or sector-oriented, self-referential ‘modi operandi’, in response to regula-
tory needs. Through the lens of administrative law, many of these responsive patterns 
and ‘modi operandi’, which help administrative actors to better tackle global issues with 
legality and consistency, look like an ‘internal administrative law’ or ‘internal law of 
administration’ within the global administrative space.49 Yet, these administrative prac-
tices not only makes global governance possible but also underpins the normative con-
tents of global administrative law. 
                                                 
47 See Esty (n 2) 1529–30; Kingsbury and others (n 9) 37–41. 
48 In line with Jon Elster’s use of ‘bootstrapping’, which involves a clean break with a preconstitutional past in con-
stitutional politics, I adopt the term here to refer to the disconnection of theorising a global administrative space 
and a corresponding global administrative law from the existing norm-laden politico-juridical space centring on 
nation-states. See Jon Elster, ‘Constitutional Bootstrapping in Philadelphia and Paris’, in Michel Rosenfeld (ed), 
Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference, and Legitimacy: Theoretical Perspectives (Duke University Press 1994) 57. 
49 See also Karl-Heinz Ladeur, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law and the Evolution of General Ad-
ministrative Law’ [2010] ExpressO <http://works.bepress.com/karlheinz_ladeur/1> accessed 15 March 2011. For 
the idea of ‘internal administrative law’ or ‘internal law of administration’, see Jerry L Mashaw, ‘Reluctant Na-
tionalists: Federal Administration and Federal Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 1801–1829’ (2007) 116 
Yale LJ 1636, 1686, 1737–40.  
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At the core of the phenomenon of global lawmaking in relation to global governance 
is what Jean Cohen calls ‘the juridification of the new world order’.50 In traditional in-
ternational law, state consent is the legal basis for the authority of international legal 
regimes51 and national constitutions provide the framework within which controversies 
regarding state consent are resolved.52 In contrast to this Westphalian world composed 
of national jurisdictions, the world order envisaged by legal globalists does not rest on 
state consent. Rather, it emerges out of a global process of juridification independent of 
an individual state’s will and also of its constitutional framework.53  
Specifically, what sets the global process of juridification apart from the develop-
ment of ‘juridification’ in terms of municipal law is the way that the law is conceived. 
In contrast to the court-centred concept of domestic juridification,54 the global process 
of juridification extends to the operation of nonjudicial actors in global governance. 
Through the lens of global juridification, the modus operandi of each subject field 
that emerges from the practice of everyday governance is institutionalised through 
myriad self-regulatory networks, developing into a networked global legal regime. 
Moreover, the global legal regime generalises and stabilises normative expectations in 
each sector of subject matter and thus enhances global governance.55 Taken together, the 
                                                 
50 Jean L Cohen, ‘Whose Sovereignty? Empire Versus International Law’ (2004) 18 Ethics and International Affairs 
1, 2. 
51 See Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Introduction’ in Martti Koskenniemi (ed), Sources of International Law (Ashgate 
2000). 
52 See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 287 (6th ed, OUP 2003). 
53 See Kuo (n 12) 997-98. 
54 See also Lars Trägårdh and Michael X Delli Carpini, ‘The Juridification of Politics in the United States and 
Europe: Historical Roots, Contemporary Debates and Future Prospects’ in Lars Trägårdh (ed), After National 
Democracy: Rights, Law and Power in America and the New Europe (Hart 2004) 41. 
55 Compare Bernhard Zangl, ‘Is There an Emerging International Rule of Law?’ in Stephan Leibfreid and Michael 
Zürn (eds), Transformations of the State? (CUP 2005) 73 (noting the wide acceptance of dispute settlement pro-
cedures in four issue areas in international law—international trade, security, labour, and environmental law—as 
indicative of an emerging (quasi)international rule of law complementing modern states’ domestic rule of law), 
with Daniele Archibugi and Iris Marion Young, ‘Envisioning a Global Rule of Law’ in James P. Sterba (ed), Ter-
rorism and International Justice (OUP 2003) 158 (arguing that an international criminal justice centred strategy 
in the place of ‘war on terror’ in response to global terrorism would contribute to a global rule of law that goes 
beyond the existing focus on international trade, investment, and environmental protection). This networked 
global legal regime results either from intergovernmental networks of regulatory cooperation or from lex merca-
toria (merchant law) and its variations. See generally GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE, supra note 45. See also 
Gunther Teubner, ‘Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centered Constitutional Theory?’ in Chris-
tian Joerges and others (eds), Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Hart 2004) 3, 21–23 (lex elec-
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networked norm-making regime amounts to the function of norms autonomously mate-
rialising in the processes of globalising governance. 
Moreover, this new model of norm-making is regarded as constituting the ‘ultimate 
rule of recognition’ on a global scale,56 according to which the distinction between law 
and non-law is made. On this view, the question of what is law and non-law in the tradi-
tional municipal legal system can no longer be decided solely by reference to national con-
stitutions.57 Rather, it has to be determined in light of the global rule of recognition in that 
municipal legal systems are reconceptualised as components of the globalised legal system, 
suggesting the emergence of a ‘constitutional’ order for the world.58 In this way, global 
administrative law not only plays the pivotal role in the juridification of global govern-
ance but also paves the way for a constitutionalised global legal order. 
Taken as a whole, a practice that is driven by a problem-solving mentality to make 
global administration functional in the eyes of global administrative law takes on consti-
tutional character as it functions as the ‘ultimate rule of recognition’ on a global scale. 
Layered with normative implications, however, global administrative law further lays 
                                                                                                                                               
tronica and lex mercatoria); Andreas Fischer-Lescano, ‘Themis Sapiens: Comments on Inger-Johanne Sand’ in 
Christian Joerges and others (n 55) 67, 72–73 (lex mercatoria, lex informatica, and lex sportiva); Michelle Ever-
son, Law and Non-Law in the Constitutionalisation of Europe: Comments on Eriksen and Fossum’ in Christian 
Joerges and others (n 55) 147, 155 (lex mercatoria and lex digitalis); Alec Stone Sweet, ‘The New Lex Mercato-
ria and Transnational Governance’ (2006) 13 Journal of European Public Policy 627. 
56 As Joseph Raz emphasises, the rule of recognition in HLA Hart’s legal theory exists as ‘a practice of the legal 
officials’and stands apart from constitutions. See Joseph Raz, ‘On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitu-
tions: Some Preliminaries’ in Larry Alexander (ed), Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations (CUP 1998) 
152, 160–62. Nevertheless, the sociological view of global constitutionalisation brings the practice-embedded 
world constitutional order closer to the Hartian rule of recognition. The term ‘rule of recognition’ is adopted here 
in a metaphorical sense. Cf Bert van Roermund, ‘Sovereignty: Unpopular and Popular’ in Neil Walker (ed), Sov-
ereignty in Transition (Hart 2003) 33, 42 (identifying Rousseau’s notion of ‘general will’ and popular sovereignty 
as ‘the ultimate rule of recognition’ in the normative system of democracies). 
57 See Cohen (n 50) 7. See also Teubner (n 55) 8. 
58 See Constance Jean Schwindt, ‘Interpreting the United Nations Charter: From Treaty to World Constitution’ 
(2000) 6 UC Davis J Int’l L & Pol’y 193; Ronald St. John MacDonald & Douglas M. Johnston (eds), Towards 
World Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community (Brill 2005). See also Seyla Ben-
habib, Another Cosmopolitanism (Robert Post ed, OUP 2006) 29, 71–72. Cf Christian Walter, ‘Constitutionaliz-
ing (Inter)national Governance—Possibilities for and Limits to the Development of an International Constitu-
tional Law’ (2001) 44 German Yearbook of International Law 170 (proposing a segmented, as opposed to com-
prehensive, version of international constitutional law). This ‘conceptual shift’ is related to the globalist episte-
mological shift to an external sociological perspective of the law. See Cohen (n 50) 7. 
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the foundations for global constitutionalism.59 As pointed out above, global administra-
tive law echoes its domestic counterpart, comprising the normative values of due proc-
ess, transparency, and accountability at the core of constitutionalism. Some of the main 
proponents of global administrative law have argued that global administrative law 
leaves out those decisions concerning ‘important questions of principle (who should 
have ultimate authority?)’ and thus falls short of a ‘framework[] of a more constitution-
alist character’.60 Nevertheless, global administrative law has been equated with ‘all the 
rules and procedures that help ensure the accountability of global administration’.61 Cor-
responding to the growing trend towards the self-constitutionalisation of the emerging 
legal regimes beyond the nation-state,62 the normative values underpinning global ad-
ministrative law are recast in constitutional terms. 
It is noteworthy that our experiences with constitutionalism are formed in the lega-
cies of state constitutionalism, which further frame our imagination with respect to the 
new global constitutional ordering.63 Accordingly, the trend to extend constitutional or-
dering beyond the state needs to be analysed in the light of our inherited constitutional 
experiences. Among the legacies of state constitutionalism, citizens’ inclination to turn 
to the guardian of the constitution, mostly the (constitutional) courts, to hold the gov-
ernment to account for implementing constitutionalism in its fullness is the underlying 
cause of the contemporary expansion of constitutionalism, driving the constitutionalisa-
tion of politics.64 Moreover, the inclination to turn to the court to implement constitu-
tionalism in its fullness by interpreting the constitution in the light of the idea of justice 
is rooted in a modernist state of mind, in which the centrality of constitution to the rule 
of law idea is conceived.65 On this view, the state power ordained by the constitution is 
conceived of as part of ‘a project of theory, as well as of practice’.66 The state, or, rather, 
                                                 
59 See Cassese (n 6) 687–89. See also Cassese (n 18) 985–86. 
60 See Krisch and Kingsbury (n 24) 10. See also Nico Krisch, ‘The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law’ (2006) 
17 EJIL 247. 
61 See Kingsbury and others (n 9) 28. See also Neil Walker, ‘Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping 
the Global Disorder of Normative Orders’ (2008) 6 ICON 373, 381 (noting the expansive character of ‘the Global 
Administrative Law project’). 
62 See Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin, ‘Introduction’ in Dobner and Loughlin (n 7) xi, xi. 
63 See Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘From Constitutions to Constitutionalism: A Constitutional Approach for Global 
Governance’ in Douglas Lewis (ed), Global Governance and the Quest for Justice, Volume I: International and 
Regional Organizations (Hart 2006) 227, 238-41. 
64 See Mattias Kumm, ‘Who Is Afraid of the Total Constitution? Constitutional Rights as Principles and the Consti-
tutionalization of Private Law’ (2006) 7 German LJ 341. 
65 See Paul W Kahn, Putting Liberalism in Its Place (Princeton University Press 2004) 265-79.  
66 See ibid. 
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the polity, cannot be disassociated from the idea of justice but is rather considered the 
means to complete the pursuit of justice. Correspondingly, the constitution that under-
lies the state and its equivalent is to be read and interpreted through theories of justice.67 
As the multiplication of the functions of fundamental rights and the expansion of the 
catalogue of constitutional rights suggest, constitutionalism in its fullness is imple-
mented by reading theories of justice into the constitution.68 For this reason, constitu-
tionalism tends to be tied to the idea of justice, standing as the ideal model of a sophisti-
cated legal system. As global administrative law operates to perfect its normative val-
ues, it also takes on constitutional character.69 To sum up, the development of global 
administrative law extends beyond the pragmatism of functional administration to 
global constitutionalism with the increase of its constitutional spillover effects. 
Towards a Small-c Global Constitutionalism 
In the preceding section, I have aimed to explain how global administrative law is re-
lated to the discussion on global constitutionalism, despite the disavowal of some global 
administrative law scholars. It is true that talks of global constitutionalism tend to stir up 
the debate on the legitimacy of global governance itself. Moreover, in terms of the elu-
sive global political community, focusing attention on the issue of legitimacy is liable to 
be dragged into the question whether political community is the precondition for consti-
tution, hampering the effort to reform global governance on the basis of the rule of 
law.70 Nevertheless, in light of our constitutional experiences with national constitu-
tional ordering, a global constitutionalism without a global Capital-C Constitution 
seems to be taking shape without contradicting the project of grounding global govern-
ance on global administrative law. 
It has long been argued that the state of a national constitutional order can only be 
grasped by taking account of both the Constitution and the practices, conventions, and 
other instruments that underpin the operation of the constitutional order.71 While the 
principles and values stipulated in the Constitution lay the foundations of a national 
constitutional order, they fall short of fully addressing the variegated issues and chal-
                                                 
67 See ibid 258, 268-72. See also Sujit Choudhry, ‘Globalization in Search of Justification Toward a Theory of 
Comparative Constitutional Interpretation’ (1999) 74 Ind LJ 819, 844; David Robertson, The Judge as Political 
Theorist: Contemporary Constitutional Review (Princeton University Press 2010). 
68 See Ming-Sung Kuo, ‘Reconciling Constitutionalism with Power: Towards a Constitutional Nomos of Political 
Ordering’ (2010) 23 Ratio Juris 390, 392-93. See also Robertson (n 67) 27-28. 
69 See Kumm (n 12) 302-03, 312. 
70 See Krisch (n 4) 59. 
71 See Lawrence Sager, ‘The Domain of Constitutional Justice’ in Larry Alexander (n 56) 235, 235-36. 
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lenges arising amid the routines of constitutional operation. Rather, the Constitution 
only provides the general reference framework within which constitutional issues are 
debated and addressed.72 Most of the constitutional issues find solution in the constitu-
tional decisions and interpretations by the judiciary or other constitutional dispute-
settlement mechanisms. Thus, to account for the state of a national constitutional order 
not only needs to understand the Constitution itself but also has to take account of con-
stitutional law developed in the processes of constitutional interpretation and construc-
tion.73 Notably, judicial interpretations of the Constitution and the case law concerning 
the Constitution are not the constitutional components of constitutional law. Some legis-
lation governing the operation of the political system, which is termed ‘super statute’ or 
‘landmark statute’, is also a part of constitutional law.74 Alongside the legislature and 
the judiciary, the executive power may also play a role in substantiating the constitu-
tional order by its decisions through administrative rule-making and political deci-
sions.75 Taken together, the interpretations made by the judicial decisions, legislative 
statutes, and executive conventions concerning the Constitution jointly constitute a 
small-c constitutional law, which complements the capital-C Constitution in accounting 
for the state of the national constitutional order.76 
It is noteworthy that in the domestic context the small-c constitution does not sup-
plant but instead supplements the Capital-C Constitution. It is true that principles and 
doctrines of case law and super statutes as well as executive decisions flesh out the in-
stitutional and normative framework established in the Capital-C Constitution. Without 
the small-c constitution, the polity conceived in the Capital-C Constitution is skeletal. 
Nevertheless, principles and doctrines of the small-c constitution are understood and 
further interpreted in light of the Capital-C Constitution. They are not freestanding prin-
ciples, however important they may be to the operation of the constitutional order. The 
Capital-C Constitution and the small-c constitutional law are tied in a dialectical rela-
                                                 
72 See Bruce Ackerman, ‘2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Living Constitution’ (2007) 120 Harv L Rev 
1737, 1756. 
73 For the distinction between interpretation and construction in understanding the constitution, see Keith E Whit-
tington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review (University Press 
of Kansas 1999) 5-14. 
74 See Ackerman (n 72) 1742 (‘landmark statue’); William N. Eskridge, Jr and John Ferejohn, ‘Super-Statues’ 
(2001) 50 Duke LJ 1215 (2001) (‘super statue’). See also Bruce Ackerman and Jennifer Nou, ‘Canonizaing the 
Civil Rights Revolution: The People and the Poll Tax’ (2009) 103 Nw U L Rev 63. 
75 See Eskridge and Ferejohn (n 15) 395-99. See also Elizabeth Fisher, Risk: Regulation and Administrative Consti-
tutionalism (paperback edn, Hart 2010). 
76 See Eskridge and Ferejohn (n 15) 9-19. 
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tionship, illuminating each other and jointly underpinning the national constitutional 
order.77 
As indicated above, global administrative law functionally provides the fundamental 
normative principles underpinning the operation of global governance. Specifically, the 
fundamental principles at the core of global administrative law are aimed to bolster the 
values of due process, transparency, and accountability, which are central to the rela-
tionship between modern administration and citizens in a constitutional order.78 Admin-
istrative law is to constitutional government what global administrative law is to consti-
tutionalised global governance.79 Thus, as global administrative law takes on constitu-
tional character with its underlying normative principles gaining currency, it stands as 
the small-c constitution of global governance. Notably, global administrative law func-
tions as a small-c global constitutionalism but is not tied to a global Capital-C Constitu-
tion, generating more questions than answers. I proceed to discuss the issues resulting 
from global administrative law as a small-c global constitutionalism in the next section.  
AN ANATOMY OF SMALL-C GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM:  
THE STATE AND CHALLENGES OF GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
I have argued that global administrative law originates in response to the calls for con-
ceiving global governance in the rule of law but develops further into a small-c global 
constitutionalism as its underlying normative principles gain currency amid the global 
trends toward constitutionalisation. In this Part, I aim to examine the characteristics of 
global administrative law as a small-c global constitutionalism without the global Capi-
tal-C Constitution. I first discuss why this view of global constitutionalism suggests the 
separation of rationality and legitimacy concerning global governance. I then proceed to 
explore the way that global administrative law as a small-c global constitutionalism ex-
presses a technocratic constitutionalism, pointing to the fundamental challenge of le-
gitimacy facing global administrative law and global governance. I conclude this Part 
with discussing how the idea of publicness is invoked as the redress to the challenges 
                                                 
77 See Harris (n 15) 104-13. 
78 See Martin M Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis (paperback edn, University of Chicago 
Press 1986) 27. 
79 Fritz Werner, a former President of Germany’s Supreme Administrative Court, once famously referred to admin-
istrative law as ‘concretised constitutional law’, expressing the close relationship between constitutional law and 
administrative law in German legal history. See Jürgen Schwarze, European Administrative Law 85-86 (rev edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell 2006) 1462 (quoting and translating Fritz Werner, ‘Verwaltungsrecht als konkretisiertes Ver-
fassungsrecht’ [1959] DVBI 527). See also Georg Nolte, ‘General Principles of German and European Adminis-
trative Law – A Comparison in Historical Perspective’ (1994) 57 MLR 191, 198-205 (1994). 
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facing global administrative law and global governance, suggesting a new concept of 
law based on a post-public concept of legitimacy. 
Rationalisation and Legitimation Untied 
Regardless of taking on constitutional character, global administrative law cannot avoid 
the issue of legitimacy.80 Rather, the concept of legitimacy is understood differently in 
global administrative law. Global administrative law aims to make decisions on global 
regulatory issues more rational, acceptable, and thus legitimate, by making global ad-
ministration more transparent, more participatory, and more accountable. However, par-
ticipation in global administration is different from the model of traditional political par-
ticipation. Global administrative law characteristically insulates global administration 
from the ordinary traditional political process. Thus, under the small-c global constitu-
tionalism underpinned by global administrative law, reasonableness and rationality con-
stitute the central concerns of enhancing the participation in global administration, while 
reasoned analysis is the common language in the policymaking network of global gov-
ernance.81 
Seen in this light, global governance does not derive its legitimacy from a higher law 
in the way domestic administration refers to national constitutions. Nor does it base its 
legitimacy on the paradigm of representative democracy on which the principal-
agent model of accountability centres.82 Legitimacy does not take the centre stage in 
the discussion on global governance anymore but is instead addressed in a more nu-
anced way. What characterises global administrative law as small-c global constitution-
alism is that policy choices result from multiple dialogues among administrative actors 
in the five types of global administration in response to the needs of the emerging global 
society.83 On the one hand, a transparent and participatory global administrative process 
is regarded as an effective check on arbitrariness and caprice by exposing possible irra-
tional policy choices to public scrutiny. Aided by the substantive principle of propor-
tionality, the regulatory decisions of global governance will come close to reason and 
rationality. In contrast to traditional types of dialogue, these dialogues are conducted 
among various special knowledge groups, constituting separate ‘epistemic communi-
ties’, so to speak. Given the prominence of reason and rationality in the making of ‘sound 
                                                 
80 See Kingsbury (n 9). 
81 See Peter L Lindseth, ‘“Weak”’ Constitutionalism? Reflections on Comitology and Transnational Governance in 
the European Union’ (2001) 21 OJLS 145, 148–51. See also Joshua Cohen and Charles F Sabel, ‘Global Democ-
racy?’ (2005) 37 NYUJ Int’l L & Pol 763, 764–65, 778–82. 
82 Cohen and Sabel (n 81) 772–84. 
83 Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel term this practice ‘deliberative polyarchy’. See ibid 779–84. 
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polic[ies]’ in transnational regulation,84 the entire network can be seen as consisting of 
‘epistemic communities’, including officials and civilians with ‘rival expertise’.85 
On the other hand, through the lens of global administrative law as small-c global 
constitutionalism, enhancing the accountability of global governance makes its reason-
able and rational regulatory choices more acceptable and thus legitimate. Although pol-
icy discourse among experts and professionals is more technical and goes beyond the 
comprehension of nonexperts,86 it is argued that expertise-based dialogue within the 
network is conducted in a deliberative, rather than prejudiced, way compared to parlia-
mentary debate and street talk.87 On this view, the ideal of deliberative democracy seems to 
find its institutional embodiment in global governance.88 For this reason, despite lacking 
global democracy and deviating from the principal-agent model of accountability, an 
accountable, rational, transparent model of global administration is not undemocratic 
but instead legitimate.89 
As described above, the small-c global constitutionalism underpinned by global ad-
ministrative law appears to address both rationality and legitimacy of global govern-
ance. It is true that democratic legitimacy built on representative democracy is not the 
only working model of legitimacy. Rather, legitimacy can be a product of different 
mechanisms such as procedural fairness, systematic consistency in policy decisions and 
rational results, to name just three.90 It is also true that these multiple models of legiti-
macy are not mutually exclusive, but instead jointly enhance the legitimacy of admini-
                                                 
84 See Lindseth (n 81) 148 (noting that participants in ‘[t]he process of “transnational” deliberative interaction’ con-
cerning the making of public policies ‘must now justify their positions as “sound policy”’). 
85 For the issues concerning the rule by ‘epistemic communities’, see Martin Shapiro, ‘Administrative Law Un-
bounded: Reflections on Government and Governance’ (2001) 8 Ind J Global Legal Stud 369, 373–74. But see 
Karl-Heinz Ladeur, ‘Towards a Legal Theory of Supranationality – The Viability of the Network Concept’ 
(1997) 3 ELJ 33, 50-51 (welcoming the increasing institutionalisation of ‘epistemic community’ through the 
‘comitology’ process in the EU). For the issue of ‘rival expertise’ resulting from the expert-centred model of ad-
ministration, see Martin Shapiro, ‘“Deliberative,” “Independent” Technocracy v. Democratic Politics: Will the 
Globe Echo the E.U.?’ (2005) 68 LCP 341, 343–49. 
86 See Shapiro (2005) (n 85) 343. Cf JHH Weiler, ‘The Constitution of Europe: “Do the New Clothes Have an Em-
peror?” and Other Essays on European Integration’ (CUP 1999) 349 (identifying ‘a general sense of political 
alienation’ with the EU comitology). 
87 See Christian Joerges, ‘“Good Governance” Through Comitology?’ in Christian Joerges and Ellen Vos (eds), 
E.U. Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics (Hart 1999) 311, 312–16. 
88 See Lindseth (n 81) 150–51. See also Shapiro (2005) (n 85) 350–51. Cf Cohen and Sabel (n 81) 779–84 (‘delib-
erative polyarchy’). For criticism, see Weiler (n 86) 283–85. 
89 See Cohen and Sabel (n 81) 773–84. 
90 See Esty (n 2) 1518–20, 1521–23. 
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stration. Multiple models of legitimation notwithstanding, it is democratic legitimacy 
under the principal-agent paradigm that lies at the centre of polemics concerning legiti-
macy. The other models of legitimacy are designed to address the challenges from de-
mocratic legitimacy. As Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel note, even the nascent models 
of accountability that are considered to enhance the legitimacy of global governance 
still centre on the concept of democratic accountability based on the principal-agent 
model.91 
This principal-agent relationship-centred concept of accountability and democratic 
legitimacy is characteristic of traditional domestic administrative law. The United States 
provides an example of this phenomenon. While the accountability model has long de-
parted from the transmission-belt type in the development of the U.S. administrative law, 
the Supreme Court has never formally abandoned the nondelegation doctrine.92 That it 
has managed to reinterpret the jurisprudence of nondelegation to allow more models of 
accountability to evolve to enhance the legitimacy of administration bears testimony to 
the grip of the principal-agent model in the conception of accountability and legiti-
macy.93 Another example of the centrality of the principal-agent model to administrative 
law is the Chevron doctrine.94 Considered one of the most influential decisions in mod-
ern U.S. administrative law,95 the Supreme Court in Chevron v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council held that the judiciary should defer to administrative agencies in statutory 
interpretation when the statutory provision at issue is unclear.96 While this judicial def-
erence is based on the expertise of administrative agencies and their accountability to 
the people by way of the President, the Supreme Court notes the premise on which ad-
ministrative agencies play the central role in interpreting statutes: ‘Congress has delegated 
policymaking responsibilities’ and agencies exercise interpretive power ‘within the lim-
                                                 
91 See Cohen and Sabel (n 81) 773–79. 
92 See generally Larry Alexander and Saikrishna Prakash, ‘Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death Are 
Greatly Exaggerated’ (2003) 70 U Chi L Rev 1297. See also Richard B Stewart, ‘The Reformation of American 
Administrative Law’ (1975) 88 Harv L Rev 1669. 
93 See Alexander and Prakash (n 92). For a theoretical discussion on the grip of the principal-agent model in the 
conception of accountability and legitimacy, see Cohen and Sabel (n 81) 774–76. 
94 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 US 837 (1984). 
95 See eg Cass R Sunstein, ‘Chevron Step Zero’ (2000) 92 Va L Rev. 187, 188 (noting the Chevron decision as a 
‘foundational, even a quasi-constitutional text’); Thomas J Miles and Cass R Sunstein, ‘Do Judges Make Regula-
tory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron’ (2006) 73 U Chi L Rev 823, 823-24 (pointing out that Chev-
ron is ‘the most cited case in modern public law’ and ‘one of the most important rulings in the past quarter cen-
tury in American public law’). 
96 Chevron, 467 US at 837. It should be noted that even under such circumstances, it does not mean that the agency 
has a carte blanche in interpreting statutes. Instead, agency interpretations must be reasonable. 
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its of that delegation’.97 Without Congressional delegation or beyond the defined limits 
of delegation by Congress, administrative agencies will lose the legitimacy for playing a 
broad role in statutory interpretation. 
Leaving aside the issue of the principal-agent model of accountability and legiti-
macy, however, a twofold presumption stands behind the assumption of self-
legitimating the small-c global constitutionalism through policy rationality and en-
hanced accountability. To take the policy decisions resulting from deliberation among 
epistemic committees involved in global administration as ‘legitimate’, first, a model 
rational citizenry equipped with sufficient scientific knowledge must be presumed. Such 
a citizenry dissolves the question of transparency to the extent that the highly expertise-
oriented policy discourse will no longer lie beyond the comprehension of the public. For 
a multilayered, reason-centred global administration to self-legitimate its own decisions, 
however, requires more than accessibility and transparency of its policy deliberations to 
the citizenry. A correspondence between the global administration and public concerns 
is also needed. A multilayered global regulatory regime self-legitimates its decisions 
only insomuch as the ‘heavily-committed true believers’ sitting on the myriad epistemic 
committees involved in global administration can be considered trustees of the general 
citizenry.98 Thus, on this rationalist model of legitimation, as opposed to one based on 
electoral representation, is presumed a general personality of the citizenry: citizens as-
sume the common personality of expert, albeit with many bodies, which is characterised 
by a heavily-committed true belief in the rational and reasonable solution of public is-
sues regardless of who makes the decision.99 
Taken together, global administrative law does not address the rationality and legiti-
macy of global governance as equally as it claims. As discussed above, the legitimacy 
of the small-c global constitutionalism, which global administrative law aims to satisfy 
by enhancing the accountability of global administration, is premised on the aforemen-
tioned twofold presumption. However, a conception of legitimacy based on presump-
tion comes close to an attempt to ‘rationalise’ the status quo of global governance, 
                                                 
97 Ibid 865. See also David J Barron and Elena Kagan, ‘Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine’ [2001] S Ct Rev 201. 
For how the Supreme Court subsequently reinterpreted Chevron and limited its scope of application by an im-
plicit invocation of the nondelegation doctrine, see Sunstein (n 95) 244–47. 
98 See Shapiro (2001) (n 85) 373–74 (questioning the model of governance based on ‘networks consist[ing] of pro-
fessionals, specialists, and heavily-committed true believers’). According to Cohen and Sabel, a trustee-based 
model of accountability turns out to be no accountability. See Cohen and Sabel (n 81) 776–77. 
99 See von Bogdandy (n 5) 238 (‘practical reason’); Cassese (n 6) 691 (suggesting scientific rationality). See also 
Gráinne de Búrca and Oliver Gerstenberg, ‘The Denationalization of Constitutional Law’ (2006) 47 Harv Int’l LJ 
243, 247, 254 (‘reason of the thing’). 
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which is oriented toward rational and reasonable policy choices.100 In sum, the incorpo-
ration of the values that derive from national constitutional experiences and constitute 
an integral part of global administrative law into a multilevel global constitutional order, 
albeit with the epithet of small-c, only results in untying the rationalisation of global 
governance from the issue of its legitimation. As a result, the issue of legitimacy keeps 
haunting global administrative law.  
Technocratic Constitutionalism without the People 
In traditional legal thinking centring on a domestic legal system, constitution is distin-
guished from the residual body of ordinary legal acts. Related to this conceptual duality 
is another evaluative duality: the legitimacy of ordinary legal acts is translated into the 
question of constitutionality; the legitimacy of constitution itself refers to the concep-
tual rubric of the constituent power, despite its multiple formations.101 That constitu-
tion stands as ‘the ultimate rule of recognition’ for domestic and international law rests 
on its origin in the people’s lawgiving, constituent power.102 
In contrast, the emerging small-c global constitutionalism underpinned by global 
administrative law suggests a new configuration of the legal order. The binding effect of 
the emerging juridified, transnational, global regime does not rest on state consent. 
Rather, its legitimacy arises out of a dynamic process in which players in various fields 
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above n 56. 
 - 22 - 
resolve a myriad of issues among themselves in response to functional demands and the 
norm of efficiency.103 These commonly accepted solutions can take various forms, in-
cluding precedents, decisions, and standardised regulations.104 What is important is that 
these effective solutions-turned-norms are added with constitutional significance,105 sup-
planting national constitutions as the ‘ultimate rule of recognition’ in deciding what is 
law and non-law.106 Unlike the relationship between constitution and ordinary legal acts, 
the process by which global administrative law evolves as a small-c global constitution-
alism with the increasing juridification of global governance is regarded as the origin 
of global constitutionalisation, blurring the distinction between constitution-making and 
ordinary lawmaking.107 
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constituent, lawgiving power. See Martin Loughlin, Sword and Scales: An Examination of the Relationship between 
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From this view, the small-c global constitutionalism underpinned by global administra-
tive law arises from, and is legitimated by, the very process through which the various 
functional systems of global governance interactively seek the most efficient solution to 
the problems of globalisation.108 The global legal regime’s self-legitimation does not 
take place at the exceptional time of a ‘constitutional moment’.109 Rather, as the devel-
opment of global administrative law into small-c global constitutionalism suggests, global 
constitutionalisation is embedded in the routine operation of the institutions involved in 
global juridification.110 Thus, the regular adjudications by judicial bodies, the specific 
decisions by regulatory agencies, and the routine negotiations among private actors all 
play a role in the nascent constitutionalisation of the global legal regime.111 As a result, 
autonomous political will, which is traditionally embodied in the exercise of constituent 
power in the making of a constitution, is not only reined in by professional and techno-
cratic rationality, but also ‘deformalised’ into the pragmatic calculation of concrete so-
lutions to particular issues.112 
Notably, a global version of constitutionalism may take multiple forms. Not all forms of 
global constitutionalism can be pinned on the autonomous norm-making processes of 
administrative law. Rather, substantive values that have been associated with the ex-
periences of constitutional democracies are the core of global constitutionalism.113 Even 
so, global constitutionalism is not merely a sort of cosmopolitan morality. Rather, it en-
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visages a political order, which results from the juridification of global governance.114 
On this view, the world not only becomes interdependent and globalised but is also effec-
tively ordered in accordance with a set of shared norms. In the face of an elusive, al-
though not inexistent, global demos, and because of the lack of a world constituent as-
sembly, alternative sources of legitimacy are needed to make the case that cosmopolitan 
values are not merely moral aspirations but have already exerted an influence on our 
behaviour.115 Thus, the problem-solving administrative actors, national and transnational, 
public and private, involved in global administration obviously set the best example for 
how the world order should be constitutionalised.116 They are the model world citizens 
who realise how making polices in the light of traditional rule-of-law values will con-
tribute to the development of global governance. The way that administrative actors in 
particular regulatory fields resolve the issues they face effectively and acceptably is 
viewed as legitimising the small-c global constitutionalism underpinned by global adminis-
trative law, while ‘sectoralism’ seems to dominate the discourse on the juridification of 
and the corresponding constitutionalisation of global governance.117 
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While the values cherished in global administrative law are widely accepted, how 
they are implemented and translated into diverse administrative fields is not beyond 
contestation. ‘Who governs and how’, the central issue concerning the legitimacy and 
organisation of power, not only looms in the creation of values but also in their articula-
tion and implementation.118 In traditional constitutionalism, this issue lies in the hands 
of ‘We the People’, whether in the form of a constituent assembly, a referendum, or the 
procedural mechanisms centring on electoral representation.119 In contrast, the small-c 
global constitutionalism underpinned by global administrative law rests on the routine op-
eration of functional systems and the everyday adoption of traditional rule-of-law values 
by players in the process of global governance without reference to another external 
source of ultimate authority such as the people. While a process of everyday constitu-
tionalisation, on which the legitimacy of global constitutionalism rests, appears to be 
heralding a new era for legal thinking by conflating the constituent-constituted distinc-
tion,120 on close inspection the attempt to derive constitutionalism from governance and 
administrative law on the global scale looks technocratic in the absence of the people 
from the scene of global constitutionalisation. The technocratic nature of global admin-
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istrative law as small-c global constitutionalism aggravates the issue of legitimacy in 
global governance. 
In the Name of Publicness: An Emerging Post-Public Legitimacy? 
Taken as a whole, two features of global administrative law as small-c global constitu-
tionalism deserve special mention. First, global administrative law is conceived of in the 
practice of global governance. It gains its normative content and importance in the op-
eration of diffuse global or transnational regulatory regimes. Second, echoing the ex-
perience that the taming of political power culminates in the constitutionalisation of 
politics, scholarship on global administrative law undergoes its own process of constitu-
tionalisation, recharacterising global administrative law in constitutional terms. It is in 
this way that global administrative law functions as the small-c constitution of global 
governance. Yet, these two features also manifest the double challenges facing global 
administrative law: legality and legitimacy. On the one hand, due to being embedded in 
the practice of global governance, how to distinguish law from non-law poses a chal-
lenge to global administrative law, calling the legality of global administrative law into 
question. On the other, as indicated in the first two sections of Part III, added with con-
stitutional significance without the democratic ground of a global constituent power, 
global administrative law as small-c global constitutionalism gets tangled up with the 
challenge of legitimacy.121 
Notably, the issues of legality and legitimacy are not new to international lawyers. 
For one thing, beyond the peremptory norms codified in treaties and decided by interna-
tional tribunals, the question as to what constitutes jus cogens was never settled.122 
Whether state consent provides the sufficient condition for the legitimacy of interna-
tional legal system remains a subject of contestation. Nevertheless, state consent pro-
vides the common ground for scholars of different persuasions to settle on what is nec-
essary for the legitimacy of international law. Moreover, with the translation of the issue 
of legality concerning jus cogens into one of legal and constitutional interpretation, the 
implementation of jus cogens by nation-states is decided in light of national constitu-
tions, which are considered the ultimate expression of the national will.123 Accordingly, 
the final solution to the questions of legality and legitimacy facing traditional interna-
tional law rests on state consent. However, as global administrative law is regarded as 
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echoing recent developments in international law in which the Hobbesian era of interna-
tional relations is coming to an end, state consent is not the solution to, but instead the 
problem of, world order. Grounded by state consent, traditional international law fell 
prey to state sovereignty.124 Against this backdrop, global administrative law is con-
ceived as unhinged from state consent.125 Thus, the double challenges of legality and 
legitimacy facing global administrative law as small-c global constitutionalism seem to 
be more intractable. 
To address the issues of legality and legitimacy under the post-Westphalian paradigm 
of international law, the notion of publicness has been invoked as the solution to the 
double challenges facing global administrative law.126 Inspired by HLA Hart’s social 
fact conception of law, global administrative law is interpreted as based on the practice 
of global governance.127 Moreover, Hart’s social fact conception of law is read through 
Lon Fuller’s notion of the ‘inner morality of law’ in order to answer the double chal-
lenges – legality and legitimacy – facing global administrative law. In this way, the rule 
of recognition at the heart of Hart’s legal theory is extended to include the notion of 
publicness.128 At the core of publicness are ‘the claim made for law that it has been 
wrought by the whole society, by the public, and the connected claim that law addresses 
matters of concern to the society as such’.129 Thus, a law that answers to publicness rests 
on a more solid normative ground than a pure Hartian conception of law,130 which is ul-
timately determined by social facts independent of normative judgment.  
To avoid the challenges facing content-based conceptions of law in the absence of 
agreement on moral values, the substantive notion of publicness is embedded in the 
practices of law.131 Notably, the underlying idea of publicness of global administrative 
law is not situated in the normative judgment external to the fact of legal practices but 
instead in the operation of the legal system itself. Given that current transnational regu-
latory regimes are oriented towards values that are clustered around the notion of pub-
licness, the practices in today’s global regulatory regimes are construed as indicating the 
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‘fit’ between Hart’s social fact conception of law and the reality of global administrative 
law.132 Publicness is understood as ‘what is intrinsic to public law as generally under-
stood’.133 On this view, publicness is rooted in, not imposed on, the various ‘publics’ 
that produce the nascent global administrative law through regulatory practices. More-
over, the attributes, constraints, and normative commitments associated with publicness 
are ‘immanent in public law’.134 Adding the normative notion of publicness to the com-
ponents of the Hartian rule of recognition concerning global administrative law, Hart’s 
positivism is reconstructed in light of Fuller’s concept of ‘inner morality of law’.135 
In this way, publicness not only resolves the question of legality concerning global 
administrative law but also suggests an alternative notion of legitimacy. Through the 
lens of publicness, variegated practices of decentred transboundary regulatory regimes 
can be further divided into those that correspond to publicness and those that do not, 
resolving the issue of what is law in the debate over global administrative law. At the 
same time, the revisionist social fact conception of law as indicated above lays the nor-
mative ground for global administrative law without being dragged into the debate over 
moral disagreement. Publicness thus provides an alternative baseline concept of legiti-
macy, answering the legitimacy challenge that results from the separation of global ad-
ministrative law from state consent.136  
It remains yet to be further analysed whether in this way publicness fully addresses 
the challenges that legality and legitimacy pose to global administrative law. In contrast 
to the sovereign state as the traditional administrative space where national administra-
tive law operates, global administrative space is decentred. Correspondingly, the revi-
sionist social fact conception of global administrative law emerges from the practices in 
heterogeneous transboundary regulatory regimes. Moreover, although the values and 
norms clustered around the notion of publicness are widely accepted, how the notion of 
publicness should be carried out in practice turns on the functioning of regulatory re-
gimes. The public of each regulatory regime is made up of regulators, regulatees, as 
well as third parties without direct interests.137 To make the claim for a law that ‘it has 
been wrought by the whole society, by the public’ and ‘addresses matters of concern to 
the society as such’,138 the carrying out of the notion of publicness cannot be dictated by 
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regulators. Rather, it must result from the values that the members, or rather, interested 
parties, of a particular regulatory regime, ie, the regulatory public, hold in common. In 
other words, publicness is associated with the public to which a particular regulatory 
regime relates.139 In the absence of a global public, however, the publics are decentred 
and indefinite, making global administrative law unintelligible. Thus, in the face of the 
overlayering publics in global administrative space, how to draw the jurisdictional 
boundaries between regulatory regimes so as to spell out the specifics of the concept of 
publicness in diverse regulatory practices poses another fundamental challenge to global 
administrative law. 
One proposal to respond to the issue of boundary drawing regarding regulatory pub-
lics, the incubators of publicness, in global administrative law is to rest publics with the 
entities that exercise regulatory powers.140 From this formalist perspective, the state and 
non-state entities that exercise public authorities and regulatory powers in global regula-
tory practices delimit the regulatory publics where global administrative law originates, 
resolving the difficulty of specifically identifying and delineating individual regulatory 
publics in this overlayered global administrative space. As a result, the issue of jurisdic-
tional distinction concerning global administrative law is recast as one of legal techni-
cality, which is resolved with the traditional conflicts of laws skills.141 
On closer inspection, however, what underlies this conception of global administra-
tive law is not the publics where the notion of publicness is substantiated but instead the 
entities that exercise regulatory powers.142 As noted above, individual regulatory publics 
that jointly constitute global administrative space are oriented towards specific fields of 
subject. These single issue-oriented regulatory publics are closer to private clubs than to 
real public communities in which the idea of publicness is expected to thrive.143  
Specifically, the public community in which the idea of publicness underlies the law 
is jurisgenerative.144 What is characteristic of a jurisgenerative community is that legal 
nomos forms through social and historical narratives, which constitute the foundation of 
a public in which the law originates.145 In contrast, the architecture of global administra-
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tive law as portrayed above is constructed around the power-exercising public entities. 
Yet, considering the following reasons, the power-exercising public entities underpin-
ning global administrative law are the opposite of a jurisgenerative public. First, the 
creation and organisation of power-exercising entities are subject only to a flimsy form 
of democratic control through treaty ratification. Second, while the operation of these 
public entities is seen as moving towards publicness, their regulatory decisions remain 
on the margins of public contestation. Outside the state arenas, only those with privi-
leged sources of intelligence concerning global administrative law are able to play the 
role of informed and active citizens in its generation. As a result, leaving the jurisgen-
erative role of the publics unaddressed and centring the carrying out of publicness on 
the public entities, this conception of global administrative law is jurispathic.146 The 
regulatory publics turn out to be the clubs of people with privileged access, contributing 
to the technocratic nature of global administrative law as small-c global constitutional-
ism. 
Moreover, to avoid the fragmentation of the international legal system in the West-
phalian era, global administrative law as the small-c constitutionalism of global govern-
ance is tasked with the management of the relationship between power-exercising enti-
ties in global administrative space. The notion of publicness is central to global admin-
istrative law in steering the inter-regulatory regime relationship, too. However, given 
the absence of generally applicable regulatory practices,147 a global notion of publicness 
that would guide the steering of the inter-regulatory regime relationship in global gov-
ernance is elusive. Thus, to manage the relationship between power-exercising entities 
in global administrative space, global administrative law as small-c global constitution-
alism needs to assess the ‘weight’ that should be given to each power-exercising public 
entity, amounting to a practice of a ‘weighing’ of the norms emerging from different 
regulatory regimes in global administrative space.148 However, the practice of weighing 
at the core of global administrative law as the small-c constitutionalism of global gov-
ernance is political in nature but lies outside of democratic control. Accordingly, global 
administrative law is untied from jurisgenerative publics, making an end run around 
democracy. The notion of publicness is thus not expressive of a public conception of 
legitimacy but rather collapses into the codes of conduct observed by privileged inter-
ested parties in individual regulatory regimes.149  
To sum up, to the extent that publicness is attributed to the diverse practices in regu-
latory regimes, the conception of global administrative law underlain thereby reflects a 
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privatised, post-public view of legitimacy.150 Moreover, in terms of its steering role in 
the inter-regime relationship in global governance, global administrative law as small-c 
global constitutionalism is centred on negotiations over the weight of these diverse 
practices concerning publicness.151 It turns out that these negotiations depend on those 
informed but privileged global actors’ views toward individual regulatory regimes, 
pointing to a post-public legitimacy. 
CONCLUSION 
Global governance has become the topic gripping the attention from various disciplines. 
Legal scholarship plays a prominent role in the discussion on global governance in that 
the idea of rule of law is considered a necessary condition for well-functioning political 
ordering. Thus, aligning global governance with the rule of law has occupied centre 
stage in globalisation studies. Among the various efforts to ground global governance in 
a legal framework is the project of global administrative law. Applying domestic admin-
istrative law tools to the myriad transnational regulator regimes in the so-called global 
administrative space is regarded as an effective response to the needs of global govern-
ance, enhancing both the accountability and transparency of global administration. With 
the increase of transparency and accountability, the policy output of global administra-
tion is expected to improve correspondingly, giving legitimacy to global governance. 
This line of thought, however, indicates that global governance cannot avoid the ques-
tion of legitimacy even if it seeks to build on global administrative law rather than po-
litically charged global constitutionalism.  
To look into how the issue of legitimacy figures in global governance, I have traced 
the trajectory of global administrative law. Corresponding to the globalisation of admin-
istrative space, global administrative law has been conceived to incorporate national and 
international administrative law. Embedded in the practice of global governance, global 
administrative law is part of the bootstrapping effort of global governance to reconstruct 
itself on a legal basis. In this way, global administrative law appears as the paradigm 
case of the international legal system in the post-Westphalian age. Moreover, echoing 
the trends toward constitutionalisation, global administrative law effectively functions 
as the small-c constitutional law of global governance. 
As it takes on constitutional character, the challenges gripping global administrative 
law are rising to the surface. On the one hand, to depart from the Westphalian system of 
international law, global administrative law is conceived in the practices of global gov-
ernance. Yet, the practice-embedded feature of global administrative law raises the 
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question of legality. It is unclear how to distinguish between law and nonlaw in the 
practices of global administrative law. On the other hand, as the concept of legitimacy is 
recast to be liberated from state consent, the small-c global constitutionalism under-
pinned by global administrative law suggests a technocratic rationality, leaving the 
question of the legitimation of global governance and the underlying administrative law 
unaddressed. Viewed in constitutional terms, global administrative law is confronted 
with the acute challenge of legitimacy. 
To address the double challenges of legality and legitimacy facing global administra-
tive law, the notion of publicness has been invoked as the solution. Resting on the inner 
morality of global administrative law, the notion of publicness is normative but imma-
nent in the operation of various regulatory regimes that jointly constitute global govern-
ance. In this way, publicness seems to resolve the issue of legality in global administra-
tive law by providing the criterion under which law and nonlaw can be distinguished. 
Moreover, the normative nature of publicness also suggests an alternative conception of 
legitimacy concerning global administrative law.  
Nevertheless, a close inspection of the regulatory publics where the supposed public-
ness of global administrative law originates shows that the regulatory publics comprise 
informed but privileged players in global administrative space. The strategy of resting 
the legitimacy of global administrative law as small-c global constitutionalism on this 
notion of publicness turns out to be the privatisation of legitimacy.152 Global administra-
tive law suggests a pragmatic path toward taming global governance with legality in-
deed. The implied post-public concept of legitimacy shows that global administrative 
law as small-c global constitutionalism may not have rid itself of challenges yet.  
                                                 
152 See ibid 1003-04. 
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